Israel presents a critical test of the well-established finding from other nations that higher education strongly influences the political attitudes of young people. Most Israelis attend university only after completing military service and are thus exposed to a powerful socializing institution before beginning higher education. This sequence may pre-empt the influence of university experience by socializing IDF members to durable political attitudes while they are serving. By means of a survey of Israeli university students who entered higher education after military service, we test whether exposure to higher education changes attitudes to Israeli Arabs and the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Despite calls to approach Israel as just another case in comparative political analysis, political scientists often focus on the unique and arguably incomparable qualities of the Jewish state. Yet as Yehezkel Dror (1996, 254) emphasizes, "recognizing Israel"s uniqueness does not negate the possibility of using Israel as a laboratory for employing . . . theories from which some generalizations might be derived." In fact, as comparativists have noted, deviant cases sometimes provide the exception that proves the rule. Following that assumption, we draw on one "deviant" aspect of Israel-its system of universal military service--to test general theories of political education. Specifically, this study examines whether the prior experience of military service by young Israelis diminishes or obviates the role of universities in political learning.
Studies conducted in the United States and other western societies have routinely emphasized the importance of institutions of higher learning in shaping the political perspectives of young adults. Because they are important venues frequented by late adolescents and young adults when they are cognitively open to external influences, universities often produce notable changes in political and social attitudes among their students. The association between individual-level education and political attitudes has aptly been described as "one of the most stable and consistent findings in empirical social research of contemporary American society" (cited in Dey 1997, 400) . Israel may be different. Because it maintains a large military based on conscription, most young Israelis postpone higher education until the completion of a lengthy period of military service. At an age when most of their peers outside Israel are immersed in universities and confronting new ideas and attitudes, young Israelis are typically exposed to another institution with considerable socializing potential--the military. Given the intensity of military service, one might well assume that young Israelis enter universities well-formed politically from that experience and, hence, relatively impervious to the socializing influence of higher education. We test that research question with survey data gathered at an Israeli university.
The first section of the paper summarizes the literature on higher education as a factor in political socialization, focusing on the general impact of university education on political attitudes and the mechanisms hypothesized to produce these effects. Most of this research comes from North America. The next section concentrates specifically on Israel, summarizing the literature on political socialization in the military and higher education. We then describe the research design, process of data collection, and major variables included in this study. The paper reports the results of our analysis and concludes with the implications of the Israeli findings for broader theories of political education.
Political Socialization and Higher Education
Driven by an assumption that "child is father to the man," the pioneering political socialization studies emphasized the role of family and early childhood experiences in the development of adult political orientations (Hess and Torney 1967; Easton and Hess 1962) . These cross-sectional studies reported strong correspondence between the political attitudes of pre-adult children and their parents (Dalton 1980) . When longitudinal research designs were employed, however, the findings undercut the determinism of these early approaches, demonstrating relatively little carryover between childhood and adult political orientations (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz 1976) . Under what became known as the "lifelong openness" model of political education (Sigel 1989) , scholars began to push the crucial period of socialization from the elementary school years to late adolescence and early adulthood, a time when people tended to develop a strong sense of personal and political identity. Of course, the very concept of lifelong openness emphasizes a plasticity in political attitudes that makes it problematic to refer to any particular period of life as crucial. Nonetheless, the nature of late adolescence/early adulthood as a time associated with identity development and exploration-the impressionable years, in short-makes that phase of life particularly conducive to political attitude change (Sears and Levy 2003) .
Newcomb et al"s Bennington studies (Newcomb 1958; Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb 1992) represent the classic expression of this perspective. Beginning in the 1930s, Newcomb began tracking the political and social attitudes of several cohorts of women who entered an all-female liberal arts college in rural Vermont. Following these students over time and well into adulthood, he found two major patterns. First, the students" political attitudes changed substantially over the course of their matriculation, moving from generally conservative to more liberal political orientations. Second, the political worldviews developed in college showed remarkable staying power over the lifespan. While there was some reversion to earlier perspectives after leaving university, students who interacted with politically likeminded people as adults (principally spouses) tended to retain the political views they acquired in college.
Because of the unique aspects of Bennington, a relatively isolated environment where largely middle class students first encountered ideological diversity, one may wonder about the generalizability of these findings. However, subsequent research with more diverse and representative samples has tended to reinforce both the critical importance of early adulthood and the college years as crucibles of sociopolitical learning and the long-term retention of political outlooks developed during that stage of life (Guimond 1999 , Jennings 1987 , Lottes and Kuriloff 1994 , Pascarella and Terenzini 1991 , Sears and Funk 1999 , Sears and Levy 2003 , Jennings and Stoker 2008 , Stubager 2009 ).
What mechanisms account for the recurrent finding of political attitude change among students during higher education? For some scholars, universities are environments where young people encounter new ideas, meet people with different backgrounds, are exposed to perspectives rare or previously unavailable to them in their prior environments, and internalize them. In effect, this "zeitgeist" model emphasizes that students are open to the political cues in the university environment because the very nature of higher education emphasizes cognitive freedom, intellectual experimentation, and exploration. During their years at university, then, students are exposed to persuasive arguments and perspectives that were previously unfamiliar to them. According to the literature, the major sources of new ideas and perspectives that students encounter in university are peers and professors (Milem 1998; Guimond 1999) . Ripe for social influence because of their youth and cognitive openness, university students may well respond to both mechanisms and thus experience attitudinal change about politics. 
The Israeli Context
Because of its constant security concerns and reliance on conscription, Israel has a much higher proportion of citizens who serve in the armed forces than most societies. As a rule, women serve two years and men from three to four depending upon their rank and unit. Such service following the completion of secondary education has long been considered a central part of the citizenship process and a venue where Israelis are socialized to the dominant codes of their society. From statehood onward, service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been conceived as an important agent of national integration and instrumental in forging Israeli identity.
Might such military service affect political attitudes and outlooks, serving as an agent of political socialization in Israel? Through a variety of mechanisms, the literature on military sociology suggests, "military service leads individuals to reconsider their identity, their attachments, and the definition of their political community, bringing these into accord with their personal experiences and hence with military policy" (Krebs 2004, 87) . That makes it plausible to assume that students who have been exposed to concentrated military service before higher education might well be relatively well-formed politically by the time they first encounter the university and thus develop resistance to whatever conflicting political cues are transmitted within academe. 2 Although there is no shortage of social scientific research on the impact of military service on Israelis, most of that work examines psychological factors such as maturation or potential influences on unit cohesion (e.g., Dar and Kimhi 2001) . There is surprisingly little research about the socializing influence of military service on the political and social attitudes of Israelis. 3 In fact, as Krebs (2004, 98) reports after reviewing this sparse literature, much of it classified and/or unpublished, "no systematic empirical evidence supports" the widespread claim about the political socializing influence of service in the Israeli military. This judgment applies even to Arian"s study which, utilizing a representative national sample of Israelis, found significant sociopolitical attitude differences between Israelis who had and hadn"t served in the IDF. Given that IDF service is strongly related to gender, religiosity and nationality, it is difficult to disentangle the causal influence of military service from the factors that predict it and thus whether IDF service or the background traits correlated with it account for the political and social differences observed between military veterans and those who did not serve. 4 There is a similar shortage of research on the political impact of university experience in Israel. While scholars have examined the impact of secondary education on a variety of political orientations (Ichilov 1991) , Israeli socialization research has not generally extended to the realm of higher education. In one of the few such studies, Shapira et al, (1986) compared the ideological identification and political system affect of a multi-university sample of Israeli students with their counterparts in the West. While the authors found that Israeli students were less countercultural than their peers elsewhere, the study did not attempt to discern whether university experience itself accounted for the political dispositions of the Israeli students. Kedem and Bar-Lev (1989) compared the political orientations of Israeli university students who had participated in different youth movements during childhood. They found strong carryover between the movement orientations encountered by their respondents during childhood and the political values they later expressed as university students. This study hints at the relative imperviousness of Israeli university students to political change during their period of exposure to higher education. Nonetheless, neither of these studies enables us to reach strong conclusions about whether military service renders Israeli university students resistant to political change while they are studying for a degree.
Research Design
Existing data about the effects of higher education on political attitudes among Israelis are not sufficient to yield definitive conclusions. Simple cross-sectional comparison of Israelis who did and did not experience higher education suffers from indeterminacy because of selection effects. Whether a person goes to university or not is strongly determined by ethnicity, national identification, and religiosity, and other social background factors that influence sociopolitical attitudes. Thus it is difficult to disentangle the independent effects of university experience from these selection effects. 5 The alternative design, a longitudinal analysis of birth cohorts across the lifespan with periodic surveys of political attitudes, could in principle differentiate respondents by whether they served in the IDF and whether they attended university. Because of the prevalence of military service, however, the number of cases would have to be considerable to isolate enough respondents who did not serve in the IDF prior to beginning higher education and who resemble those who did in terms of background traits. In any case, such a survey has never been conducted in Israel and the sheer costs of tracking respondents across the lifespan makes it extremely unlikely that it will.
Faced with this reality, we opted instead for a cross-sectional design that tested the sociopolitical attitudes of Israeli university students who had served in the IDF but varied in the amount of time they had been exposed to higher education. This approach controls for selection effects in military service and attendance at university by excluding respondents who did not serve in the military before attending university. Because members of our student sample differ in terms of such important political influences as gender, ethnicity, religiosity and other factors, we are able to discern the net impact of additional exposure to higher education after controlling for these social forces. This design does not allow us to test directly for the effects of military service on political attitudes because we lack data on university students who did not serve in the IDF prior to matriculation. Thus the results only allow inferences about what mechanisms account for the presence or absence of any observed attitude change among Israeli university students who entered higher education after discharging their military obligations.
The study was conducted during May and June of 2009 at Haifa University. Unable to obtain a list of university students that would have permitted random selection of respondents and unwilling to sample from a haphazard set of specific classes, the sample was instead recruited via venue sampling, a variant of time-space sampling (TSS) typically utilized by researchers to reach a "hidden" or "hard-to-reach population" (Muhib et. al 2001, 216) . This technique of locating respondents in geographic areas where they are known to cluster was adapted by identifying five major locations where students typically gathered outside of class.
6 Whether these sites were inside or outside, they were all popular locations close to or part of an on-campus coffee house or food venue.
Following Stueve and colleagues" (2001) model, the five designated venues were randomly selected to be the surveying location of the day by using a random number generator. Surveying took place throughout the school week, from Sunday through Thursday (the normal school week). Three two-hour time slots were used as designated surveying times and were randomly assigned to each day of interviewing. To randomize at the level of individuals, the researcher approached every third student, asking the student (in Hebrew) to participate in the study.
Screening for the target population, Israeli Jewish students who had served in the military, was conducted before and after approaching a potential respondent. 7 Students who agreed to participate were then asked to sign a consent form and to fill out a paper and pencil questionnaire in Hebrew. Under the circumstances, it was not possible to measure response rate with precision but that is estimated to be in the 20-30% range. After excluding ineligible cases, the procedure yielded 276 completed interviews. 8 Recognizing that Haifa University differs from other Israeli universities in its catchment area (the north of Israel), high proportion of Arab students (estimated at 20%), and other respects, we do not intend to generalize the marginal frequencies (the percentage of responses to each question option) to all Israeli university students. As we are interested in the relationships between variables rather than the distribution of the dependent variables per se, this sample bias is not consequential (Schuman 1986) . Within the University itself, the sample underrepresented the proportions of females, undergraduate students, and those studying a liberal major (a concept defined below), with disparities ranging from 12-19 percent among the three variables for which we obtained aggregate information from the Registrar. Rather than employ weighting techniques, we control for sample bias by including gender, major and student status as statistical controls. This strategy is consistent with recent scholarship on survey research that demonstrates the capacity of apparently biased samples to yield representative attitudes when the bias is unrelated to the questions asked in the survey and the potential sources of bias are included in the statistical model (Groves 2006 , Groves & Peytcheva 2008 . As the survey is not principally about gender, major, or student status, these differences are unlikely to bias the results.
Variables
To make manifest what has been implied, we hypothesize that increasing levels of higher education among Israeli university students who served in the IDF will predict higher levels of tolerance toward Arab Israelis and more "dovish" attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These two dependent variables were selected for strong theoretical reasons. Tolerance assesses the degree to which respondents supported civil equality for the Israeli Arab minority. 9 We selected tolerance because numerous studies around the world have reported strong correlations between this concept and the experience of higher education (Jennings & Stoker 2008 , Stubager 2009 , Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton 2007 . If any variable is likely to respond to higher education, tolerance is thus the prime candidate. The measure was specified for Israeli Arabs because their situation most strongly tests Jewish Israelis" commitment to civil liberties for unpopular minorities (Soen 2003) . Although the Israeli Proclamation of Independence promises basic rights and freedoms to all residents, Israeli citizens of Palestinian descent have posed a challenge to this dictum because they are widely regarded by Jewish Israelis as a potential security threat. Indeed, a 1998 survey found such massive social distance between Jewish and Arab Israelis that the authors used "hatred" to characterize the relationship (Pedahzur and Yishai 1999) . In the 1980s, Seligman and Caspi (1983) reported that a "strong minority" of Israeli Jews, around one-third of a national sample, would deny basic political rights to their fellow citizens who were Arabs. Almost thirty years later, a survey of Jewish high school students found that fully half rejected the idea that Israeli Arabs should enjoy the same rights as Jews and an even larger proportion would deny Arabs the right to run for the Knesset (Kashti 2010 ).
The tolerance scale drew questions from Seligson and Caspi (1983) about the right to vote, right to public assembly, freedom of speech, and the right to hold public office. The fifth question inquired about the right of Israel"s Arab citizens to attend university. Scores on the five-item tolerance scale ranged from 0-20 with higher values on the scale indicated more tolerant attitudes and greater support for the civil equality of Israel"s Arab citizens. The Cronbach"s alpha was .91, indicating the same high level of reliability observed in Seligson and Caspi"s national sample, and the mean tolerance score was 12.05.
The second dependent variable was a composite scale of attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict. By all accounts, the ongoing conflict has been for decades the "central, critical, and engulfing issue" in Israeli political life (Shamir and Arian 1999, 266) . The conflict has such potency, Shamir and Arian suggest, because it serves as a touchstone for ongoing dilemmas of Israeli identity related to religion, culture, citizenship and other existential concerns. Precisely because it is so foundational, we suspect that attitudes to the components of the scale are likely to be relatively fixed well before Israelis begin university-particularly following military service-and much less responsive than tolerance to the forces that promote attitude change among young adults attending university. If tolerance is an "easy" case prone to support the research hypothesis, attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is a "hard" case that resembles a critical test.
This measure incorporates seven questions from several of Arian"s studies (Arian 1989 (Arian , 1992 (Arian , 2002 (Arian , 2003 Arian, Shamir and Ventura 1992) and adds another. These questions tapped attitudes about core issues involving Israeli policy toward Palestinians and the surrounding Arab statesquestions about support for the two-state solution, land for peace, responsibility for failures of peace initiatives, rights to residents of the Occupied Territories, whether Israel should encourage its Arab citizens to leave, military strength, and relative preference of the rule of law versus security interests. The items scaled with an alpha of .78, indicating a strong relationship among them. Scores on the 8-item dove scale ranged from 0-24. The items were coded so that an increase in value denotes a more dovish political opinion. The mean score of the sample was 13.4.
The core independent variable is years of higher education, coded from 1-4 with 1 for first-year undergraduates and 4 representing graduate students.
10 (There were, respectively, 116, 35, 76, and 42 cases in the first year, second year, third year and graduate categories.) Two other key variables corresponded to the major theories about how the university experience influences student attitudes. Major indicated whether a student was studying in a traditionally "liberal" or "conservative" field, a factor shown to affect political attitudes in other studies (Stubager 2009 ). Since the overall purpose of this investigation focused on the impact of university experience, it was logical to determine if a student"s specific major, as opposed to the general college experience, was the key determinant to a change in political attitudes.
11 Majors in the humanities, liberal arts, and social sciences were coded as liberal (and assigned the higher value) while life sciences, economics, mathematics and business were classified as "conservative." Another explanation for university impact emphasizes a student"s peer group. We attempted to get at this difficult to measure concept by assessing the degree to which a student"s friendship network was dominated by other students at Haifa University. While providing less information than a fullblown network analysis, this variable nonetheless identifies students who are most socially integrated on campus and who, therefore, should be open to attitude change.
Beyond these central variables, the models also included a number of controls that previous research suggested as influences on political tolerance and attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict--gender, religiosity, ethnicity and kibbutz background.
12 As Seligson and Caspi noted in their pioneering study of tolerance among Israeli Jews, "the younger, less religious, better educated, and more affluent Israeli Jews express higher levels of general tolerance" (1983, 62) . Precisely these same groups typically adduce more dovish attitudes to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Additionally, men, Sephardic and/or religious Jews are more likely to be relatively more politically intolerant and hawkish than their counterparts (Moore and Aweiss 2002) . Sephardic Jews who trace their heritage toward Arab lands are known for negative attitudes toward Arabs and hawkishness (Seliktar 1984) . By contrast, kibbutzim have historically been known for their strong leftist values and their young are likely to develop high levels of both tolerance and a more dovish orientation to the conflict (Abramitzky 2008) . Accordingly, the models included a dummy variable to indicate whether the student had ever lived on a kibbutz.
We included one variable among the predictors in the tolerance equation but not the equation predicting attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict-ideological self-definition (left or right) based on security issues. (This variable was also coded in a liberal direction.) When measuring respondents" willingness to grant civil liberties to groups, Sullivan et al (1982) have argued the importance of controlling for the perceived threat posed by the group to society. Precisely because Israeli Arabs may be seen as a fifth column, Israeli Jews are quite likely to condition support for their civil liberties on sensitivity to security issues.
13 By including a left-right scale based explicitly on security issues, we will control for the underlying threat perception. Because ideological differences in Israel are so heavily conflated with attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, including self-identification in the second equation would amount to predicting the dependent variable by itself. Hence, the security variable is not entered to predict attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Analysis
In the following analysis, we use the basic OLS statistical model to predict both dependent variables (tolerance and the Arab-Israeli conflict scale). Although the dependent variables are not measured at the ratio level, they resemble such variables with a wide range and normal or nearnormal distributions. Given the robustness of OLS to violations of assumptions and the intuitive interpretation of OLS regression coefficients, it is the preferred statistical technique for this multivariate analysis. For ease of interpretation, we remind readers that the dependent variables are coded in a right to left direction so higher scores indicate a greater propensity to support civil liberties for Israeli Arabs and a more dovish view on the conflict. The unstandardized coefficients can be read straightforwardly as the impact of a unit change in the independent variable on the dependent variables. Table 1 (below) reports the findings for tolerance. Focusing on the critical independent variables, we discovered that greater exposure to higher education (measured by year in school) does indeed promote support for extending civil liberties to Palestinian Israelis. All other things being equal, each additional year of matriculation increases tolerance by about one point on the scale. The two factors thought to promote this tendency, a liberal major and an extensive friendship network, do indeed carry positive coefficients but neither reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. Of the control variables, only the security orientation exerted a strong effect on tolerance. The more the student inclined to a leftist self-definition on security issues, the stronger the commitment to Arab civil liberties. Each step from strongly right to strongly left increased the scale value by roughly one and two-thirds points. Although the coefficients for secularity, kibbutz residence, and ethnicity (Sephardi identification) pointed in the expected direction, they fell far short of statistical significance. In all likelihood, the variable representing security orientation soaked up the variance that would otherwise have been attributed to these controls.
A similar analysis was conducted for the dovishness scale, yielding the results in Table 2 . As it did for tolerance, years in school had a significant, positive influence on students" attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The magnitude of the effect, an increase of one scale point for each year in university, was similar across the two dependent variables. Neither of the two proposed mechanisms, friendship network and major, had any appreciable influence on dovishness. Among the controls, we found two with significant effects. By approximately three points and one and a half points, respectively, students who had lived on a kibbutz and those who self-identified as secular rather than religious were on the whole more dovish than others. That finding was consistent with our expectations. Although the coefficient did not attain statistical significance, students who considered themselves Sephardi were, as expected, more hawkish than their peers.
Discussion
The statistical analysis in the previous section indicated that exposure to higher education among Israeli Jewish students who had prior military experience was associated with greater tolerance to Arab Israelis and a more dovish orientation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This finding was consistent with our expectation that tolerance would be quite responsive to higher education, a pattern widely detected in other countries. We were a bit surprised that the university influence was potent enough to change attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, an orientation that largely defines Israeli political identity.
The finding of a statistical association between tolerance and years of higher education emerged despite a series of control variables that are associated with both variables. Hence the relationship is not spurious. However, there are potential rival hypotheses that need to be considered before we accept this finding.
Perhaps, as our first alternative explanation, the impact of additional higher education on tolerance and dovishness can be explained by differential drop-out patterns. This assumes that students who are intolerant or uncomfortable among Israeli Arabs do not enjoy attending a university with a large population of Palestinians or with a political ethos that promotes mutual understanding. If these students are more likely to drop out, then the increase in tolerance and dovishness across the four categories from first year to graduate students could simply be an artifact of compositional differences. Although we lack data to test this argument, the Registrar of the University indicated to us that there is a very low dropout rate from year to year and that most students who leave do so because of personal problems or financial constraints. That makes it very unlikely that the tolerance effect is a consequence of differential dropout.
As a second possibility, the results may be due largely to the graduate student component of the sample. Post-graduate students are likely to be self-selected on the basis of attributes that make them quite different from undergraduates and perhaps they are largely responsible for the apparent growth in tolerance as years at university increases. We can test this hypothesis two ways, by including age as a predictor (since graduate students are older on average than undergraduates) and by rerunning the analysis with only undergraduates. The results from supplementary analysis (results not shown) enable us to reject this alternative interpretation unreservedly for tolerance. By controlling for age and (separately) removing graduate students from the analysis, the coefficient for tolerance on years in school actually increased in magnitude (from 0.86 in Table 1 to .95 and 1.06 respectively) and, despite the loss of cases, retained the same statistical significance. None of the other variables changed sign or significance by virtue of the changes in the model. For attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, there was some slight movement consistent with the alternative interpretation but it was not terribly consequential. When the dataset was reduced by excluding graduate students (results not shown), the impact of years in school increased without any loss of statistical significance. However, with the addition of age as a predictor in the full dataset, there was some attenuation as the years in school variable diminished slightly to .65 (from .83 in Table 2 ) and the significance level was .059. Because age and years at school were each significant and positive influences on dovishness when included in equations without the other, the drop in significance for year in school seems likely due to multicollinearity. This suspicion is reinforced by the correlation of .50 (Spearman"s rho) between year in school and age and the corresponding drop in tolerance (using that term in a statistical sense) for both variables when the other was included in the equation. Under the totality of circumstances, it does not appear that older students and/or graduate students are responsible for the growth in dovishness associated with additional exposure to higher education.
Finally, as Jennings and Stoker note, the apparent growth in tolerance over the university years could be a function of social desirability effects. As they write, "the presumed effects of higher education in the realm of political tolerance, in particular, have been challenged on methodological grounds . . . that better educated people have simply learned to express more socially desirable opinions in response to survey questions" (2008, 4) . If tolerance of Palestinians is "politically correct" in an academic setting, the increase in scale values associated with additional years at university could simply index the greater awareness of such views as students become more familiar with the culture and norms prevalent in the university. We doubt this is actually the case. First, it is not so clear that political tolerance is de rigueur in the university setting where the research was conducted. The frequencies for the items making up the tolerance scale indicate that a large proportion of Israeli Jewish students do not exhibit particularly tolerant perspectives. In fact, only a minority of the student sample endorsed Israeli Arab rights to vote, demonstrate or hold public office, hardly evidence of a strong civil libertarian norm that could induce yea-saying.
14 Second, social desirability effects are much more likely to emerge in surveys that match respondents with an interviewer-face to face or via telephone. When survey questions are administered by secret ballot, notwithstanding the presence of an interviewer, respondents are much more willing to report socially undesirable or non-normative views telephone (Aquilino 1994) . In this study, students completed an anonymous self-administered questionnaire out of direct gaze of the person who recruited them to participate-a situation much more like a secret ballot than a formal interview. Finally-and this is entirely subjectiveanybody who has spent time in Israel will attest that Israelis are highly unlikely to disguise their views in conversation solely to avoid discomfiture. 15 Thus, while we cannot rule them out definitively, we think it unlikely that the observed protolerance effect associated with attendance at universities is a consequence of unmeasured factors. Rather, we believe it attests to the power of higher education to promote more empathy for minorities. This effect largely overrides the other social factors that have traditionally been associated with tolerance in cross-sectional studies and even persists with a control for security concerns that might well diminish tolerance. Once Israelis attain university status, it appears, the differences between ethnic groups, religious identification, and other traits largely fall away. The effect of higher education is not massive but, considering the large number of factors that influence tolerance, it is noteworthy. We find it especially important because, as noted, Israelis typically enter university only after a period of military service that one might well imagine as fixing attitudes for the entire lifespan.
At the same point, the findings remind us of the limits of universities. The impact of university experience on attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict was not quite so substantial in that students from a secular and/or kibbutz background were distinctive in their dovishness even after taking account of years of schooling. No such pattern was apparent on tolerance. However, students apparently enter universities with orientations to the Arab-Israeli conflict that predate matriculation and that do not lose potency even as the university environment poses challenges to pre-existing views. That finding is consistent with the discovery that the residues of participation in youth groups are apparent for students in higher education.
Indirectly, the results also undermine the model of the military as a powerful socializing agent. The results are indirect because we could not compare the attitude change registered among veterans of the IDF with people who did not serve prior to university. With a large number of university students who did not serve in the IDF but who resembled those who did-a relatively rare population-we might have found much larger changes in attitude over the course of a university career. 16 Even with this proviso, the results tend to reinforce Kreb"s (2004) strong skepticism that military service leaves powerful or lasting political residues among those who have experienced it. For all the centrality of the IDF in Israeli experience, it does not seem to fix political attitudes rigidly or inure veterans to other influences that shape political learning.
Thus the Israeli case, for all its uniqueness, offers valuable insights about the conditions that both enhance and diminish the political learning of young adults. The basic finding of prior research conducted elsewhere, that attendance at university is a significant socializing agent in political development, was sustained even in this distinctive and unpromising environment. That lends credence to Dror"s notion, cited at the outset of the paper, that studies conducted in Israel may reinforce generalizations developed in other contexts as well as undermine them. (N=195) 8 As an experiment, students in one interview period were offered a free slice of pizza to enhance participation. Unlike their American counterparts, who can usually be bribed with free food, this incentive did not encourage cooperation and about half of the participants politely declined a slice. We encourage follow-up research on this critical difference in cross-national reactions.
9 The terminology to denote this group is contested. Jewish Israelis, roughly eighty percent of the population, traditionally used the term "Arab Israelis" for Arabs holding Israeli citizenship. Under growing nationalism and identification with Arabs in the Territories (another contested term!), many members of this group prefer to label themselves as "Palestinian Israelis" or just Palestinians. We will use the terms interchangeably although we suspect that most Jewish Israelis still think of the minority in question as Arabs.
10 Israeli higher education follows the British model with undergraduate degrees typically awarded after three years of study and students taking courses solely in their major or cognate fields. 11 We acknowledge that it is unclear whether students pick majors that are congenial with their attitudes or adjust their attitudes to match the climate of opinion prevalent among students in the major.
12 Respondents were coded as secular and Sephardi, if they selected those alternatives, respectively, from the 
